"There is nothing wrong with a room full of people counting the paper ballots. It's not antiquated, it's not inefficient. It's one part of the election process that should be celebrated."

With all due respect, that's a crock.

Yes, a room full of people counting paper ballots IS both antiquated and inefficient. But more than that, it's a process that has even more fraud potential than Diebold's suspect machines, especially in one-party towns, be they St Louis or Joplin.

The allegedly "bipartisan" checks and balances of judges and clerks in our city polling places and at the Board of Election Commissioners don't really exist in real life. Next time you vote, look for the red name tags. Do you find yourself thinking, "I didn't know s/he was a Republican"? Chances are s/he isn't. There aren't enough real Republicans interested in taking those jobs in the city, and Democrats are more than happy to fill the void with a few of their own, posing as Republicans. In Joplin, it's the same story, but transpose the names of the parties. I don't want those people in charge of counting votes.

Still skeptical? Forget the parties. In the 1991 school board election, the contest was very polarizing along racial lines. Neighborhoods were much more segregated than today, so most people in any polling place were of the same race. In some parts of south St Louis, all the judges and clerks, regardless of party (nominal or otherwise), were for the same slate of candidates. In north St. Louis, all the judges and clerks, regardless of party (nominal or otherwise), were for the same opposing slate of candidates. When the losing slate of candidates forced the E Board to investigate, they found that in some precincts (albeit not enough to change the outcome) there were forged signatures of voters who purportedly came to the polling place to cast votes, even though they were infirm "shut-ins" in their 90s who hadn't voted for a long time.

Even if the crooks change the vote in favor of the candidates I want, I still don't want them counting the votes. The integrity of the system is too important.

The integrity of the system is the bottom line. We need to come up with the most tamper-proof system possible. But change needs to be for the better, not for the worse.

Matthew -
Your blog entry is factually incorrect, incomplete, and misleading ....
First, all jurisdictions across the country have moved to new systems that insure more accountability and access. All the companies selling the systems have come in for criticism - this strikes me as the nature of change. There are dozens of articles about concerns with all the new systems and companies. One article in the WaPost may give an incomplete picture.
Second, my concern that you have recieved an incomplete picture is furthered by your point about paper trails. You see, the system that the City purchased has a paper trail: there is a paper ballot if you vote by optical scan and there is a paper record if you vote on the touchscreen. We demanded this for just the reasons that you cite - security and the check and balance necessity. So, there are and will be paper records of votes - and the City Board is committed to auditing our elections to assure (and check and re-check) our elections.
The Board of Elections continues to hold itself - and City voters - to the highest standards of transparency, integrity, and accountability in all its dealings. We have - for over 6 months - held open hearings and hundreds of conversations about how/what we will do to change our systems.
I am very sorry that your post was put into cyberspace without a better understanding of what really is going on. Most people will not read the comments like mine but will instead leave with an impression of the election system based on your incorrect post. I hope for better ...
Ed Martin, St. Louis City Board of Elections

Matthew -
Your blog entry is factually incorrect, incomplete, and misleading ....
First, all jurisdictions across the country have moved to new systems that insure more accountability and access. All the companies selling the systems have come in for criticism - this strikes me as the nature of change. There are dozens of articles about concerns with all the new systems and companies. One article in the WaPost may give an incomplete picture.
Second, my concern that you have recieved an incomplete picture is furthered by your point about paper trails. You see, the system that the City purchased has a paper trail: there is a paper ballot if you vote by optical scan and there is a paper record if you vote on the touchscreen. We demanded this for just the reasons that you cite - security and the check and balance necessity. So, there are and will be paper records of votes - and the City Board is committed to auditing our elections to assure (and check and re-check) our elections.
The Board of Elections continues to hold itself - and City voters - to the highest standards of transparency, integrity, and accountability in all its dealings. We have - for over 6 months - held open hearings and hundreds of conversations about how/what we will do to change our systems.
I am very sorry that your post was put into cyberspace without a better understanding of what really is going on. Most people will not read the comments like mine but will instead leave with an impression of the election system based on your incorrect post. I hope for better ...
Ed Martin, St. Louis City Board of Elections

Matthew -

Your update is interesting ... but still a little odd. Do you subscribe then to the theory that we should return to hand-counting paper ballots? Because the "electronic" counting systems for the past few decades - punchcards - use computer technology just as sure as the newer systems that we have purchased. Again, I drive back to the point: any system is only good as those who are operating it and those people must do everything to protect the integrity of the system.
Some are very nervous that the new systems have computers that could be hacked or sabotaged. But it is a closed system (not linked to the internet) and in that sense is just like the punch card system (closed and not linked to the internet).
My concern is that too many people are mistakening a new system for a new set of concerns ... the concerns are the same as they ever were (integrity, transparency, confidence) - and how we address the concerns must get better and better.
All the best.
Ed

I think the Election Board made a bad decision by going with Diebold: http://blog.thecommonspace.org/archives/000428.php

So do a lot of other technology professionals: http://slashdot.org/search.pl?query=diebold

Me think Ed doth protests too much.

One giant step towards integrity would be to make it possible to get registered voters who no longer live in the city off of the voter rolls. To this point, I have returned the Election notification cards for the previous owners of my house(who have moved to California) for the last 15 or so elections. Like clockwork, I receive cards for all four registered voters at this address. I think that with just a little housekeeping, the ubiquitous questioning of integrity would subside.

Although I share some of Matthew's general concerns about the validity of the electronic voting systems being put in place across the country, I still think they are an improvement over the punch-card system.

Punch-card ballots are, of course, read by a computer. Really, optical scan isn't that much different; just a slightly more advanced version of the technology. Optical scan machines have been in use for standardized testing purposes for at least 20 years, so there's a track record there of proven technology. So long as you fill in the bubbles properly with #2 pencil. ;-)

Actually, I think the new op-scan voting machines are a little more sophisticated than that. The touch screen devices concern me more, because many people may have difficulty reading them. When you have something printed on paper, I feel a little better about it. After all, touch screens haven't exactly caught like wildfire in other areas of our lives, despite attempts to use them in building 'smart' houses and at grocery store checkouts.

In any event, as long as there is some kind of a paper trail to allow for hand recounts when necessary, we should be in pretty much the same situation as we are with the punchcard ballots.

The connections between Diebold and the RNC are what concern me more. If they were a firm like, say, Anheuser-Busch, which crassly donated equally to both parties, I'd be less concerned.

Since we seem to have Mr Martin reading along, my questions for him is will the machines will be gradually brought in or introduced all at once?

I'm all for getting rid of hand counting. Everytime I go to vote the thought of the little old ladies counting my ballot scares the bejezuz outta me.

It's an old entrenched system that will take time to implement for sure. St.Louisians dont seem to take to change too well Ive noticed and their are flaws with the system like the registration cards that Tim R pointed out- I also had to do the same thing for the previous owner of my house.

At least it's a step in the right direction

Hmm...I better clarify my position. I am in favor of systems, electronic or otherwise, that will increase accuracy in marking a ballot as well as speed the process of tabulating the votes. I would like to see that at the base is a paper ballot, not merely a paper trail.

The optical scan machines seem like an effective compromise. You mark your ballot, it is then read by a machine and the vote total gets sent downtown. Meanwhile your marked ballot remains in secure storage in the event a recount is necessary. A touchscreen machine that would print out a marked ballot that is then processed like the optical scan ballot is also an option.

I would oppose a system that is completely electronic, like a network of ATMs. Though any system may be vulnerable to fraud, I would prefer that even if my vote is printed by a machine and then the totals from my ward are transmitted electronically to be summed-up downtown, I know that at the base of the system is a paper ballot that a voter has marked with their intent. A paper trail provides an audit, but for me, that is insufficient.

As for security, despite Oracle's concerns, which would be more difficult to conceal, a small group of people committing electronic fraud, or a small army of people dumping ballots? Which avails itself of better oversight; a system that requires specialized knowledge to evaluate and authenticate, or one in which anyone could stand and watch.

The problem raised by Tim R is a well-intentioned federal voter rights law that prohibits election authorities from removing people from voter rolls unless the voter her/himself (not the new resident of the house) requests in writing that her/his name be removed, or the authority receives proof of death, commission of felony, etc. The E-Board tried to respond by keeping apparently moved voters registered on a separate inactive voters list, but that worked poorly in the 2000 election fiasco.

Matthew, it's not about tolerance for whichever kind of fraud is a lesser evil (since pols will always decide that the kind that favors them is obviously the lesser evil). We need to be vigilant (I don't mean to step on anybody's trade name) about ALL kinds of fraud. Election fraud goes to the very heart of the public's confidence in the system.

The most significant issue is usability. Even before you can get to tampering issues--one has to have a system that voters can utilize a few times a year and not be challenged by the complexity or the design of the instrument.

David Kimball at UMSL's study of all of this came down to those under consideration for the County and City, ESS and Diebold were far more intuitive for users and thus more likely to record their wishes when they physically vote.

In terms of Diebold itself, I'm most concerned about the corporate governance issues and whether, once the City has adopted the product, will it still be developed further if Diebold goes under or will the City have to reinvest in new equipment?

Certainly Diebold's ATM business would continue even if the business goes belly-up, but I'm not sure the voting technology industry is going to be excited to pick up another company that is incompatible with their current systems.

The thing most don't seem to understand is that all counting systems could be corrupted by programming including punch card voting systems--it's just that punch card systems use a 40 year old technology that has problems on top of being capable of being tampered with--the solution is a paper trail and Missouri requires a paper trail.

Brian makes good points about the stability and security of the system as well, though I'm not convinced that the other systems would stand up to much scrutiny either--unless Brian knows more about it.

A few answers:

We are undertaking the large task of thoroughly reexamining our registration and datebases - not just for content but to understand our internal processes. We will do better with regard to keeping our voter lists up to date.

As to how we will "switch over" to the new systems, the answer is an emphatic "yes." Just kidding ... I know the answer was not a "yes or no" question. To answer completely, we are not required for the April 2006 election to have both the touch screen and the optical scan in place (since it is not a federal election). However, we plan to have both in place. The only difference between April 2006 and August/November 2006 is that in April, we will have about one-third of our touch screens deployed (one in every polling place for sure) and in August/November 2006, we will have them all out (3 or more per polling place). This is based on our own analysis of the April election (pretty straightforward election in terms of ballots, etc.) and our desire to ramp up our poll worker training.

Thanks for asking. Can I count on all of you as judges/poll workers in the upcoming elections?!?

All the best.

Ed Martin, St. Louis City Board of Elections

Hey Ed, I'm not one to defend Republicans, but you're not getting a fair shake on the selection of Diebold. I know that many people are suspicious of Diebold since 2004.

But I have serious doubts about any fraud due to the nature of such a conspiratorial undertaking that would have to occur for someone to swing an election through tampering with the machines. There would be more evidence of this happening, had it occurred.

I don't have a problem with the Diebold machines (mainly because they DO provide a paper trail), they are machines that make no distinction to political ideology, and quite frankly, I can't wait to use 'em.

One thing to keep in mind--all electronic means of vote counting can be tampered with--since there is a paper trail that can be audited.

What disturbs me most about the discussion is that few are worried about usability--and Diebold has very good usability numbers according to David Kimball. I give Ed and the rest of the Board credit for sorting that out and making a decent decision.

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